

Lecture 5 19 Sept. 07


Last time - Nash Equilibrium

Defn A strategy profile $(s_1^*, s_2^*, \dots, s_N^*)$ is a NE if, for each i , her choice s_i^* is a best response to the other players' choices s_{-i}^*

Motivations (1) no regrets

no individual can do strictly better by deviating, holding others fixed

(2) self-fulfilling beliefs



		2		
		l	c	r
1	U	0, 4	4, 0	5, 3
	M	4, 0	0, 4	5, 3
	D	3, 5	3, 5	6, 6

$BR_1(l) = M$ $BR_2(U) = l$
 $BR_1(c) = U$ $BR_2(M) = c$
 $BR_1(r) = D$ $BR_2(D) = r$

NE = (D, r)

		2		
		l	c	r
1	U	0, 2	2, 3	4, 3
	M	11, 1	3, 2	0, 0
	D	0, 3	1, 0	8, 0

NE = (M, c)

« Concepts: Dominance
Best Response
Nash Equilibria »

Relate NE to Dominance

		2	
		α	β
1	α	0, 0	3, -1
	β	-1, 3	1, 1

β is strictly dominated by α

NE is (α, α)

		2	
		l	r
1	U	1, 1	0, 0
	D	0, 0	0, 0

(U, l) is a NE,

but so is (D, r)

Investment Game

players - you

strategy sets - invest 0 or invest \$10

payoffs - if do not invest, then $\rightarrow 0$

if do invest \$10, \rightarrow $\begin{cases} \$5 & \text{net profit if } \geq 90\% \text{ invest} \\ -\$10 & \text{net loss if } < 90\% \text{ invest} \end{cases}$

NE = $\begin{cases} \text{all invest} \\ \text{no-one invest} \end{cases}$

guess and check

"converged"

« different social problem than that of prisoners dilemma »

Coordination - communication can help

NE can be self enforcing agreements